The Greek military camp in the ten thousand´s army by Alvárez Rico, Mauricio G.













MAURICIO G. ÁLVAREZ RICO 
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ABSTRACT - RESUMEN 
The first and main conclusion of this study of the Xenophon´s works is that the Greek military camp should 
be the subject of research and should get more than ten pages at most in any handbook on Greek warfare. Once 
the castramental vocabulary problem is resolved, and we know the exact difference on meaning between words 
like τ στρατπεδον, τ πλα or σκηνω, it will be possible to attempt an approximation to Greek castramen-
tal theory of the 4th century as it would have been described in lost contemporary works, such as the one by Aeneas 
Tacticus. The Greek military camp seems to have had a high level of professional organisation, with a regular plan 
and internal structure, a very sophisticated watch guard system and a routine that shows the generals´ concern for the 
order and discipline of their troops. Inside the camp it was the συσκηνα (the group of soldiers who shared the same 
tent) the basic logistical (and also probably, tactical) unit in the Greek armies on campaign. 
La conclusión principal de este estudio de las obras de Jenofonte es que el campamento militar griego puede 
y debe ser investigado, pudiéndosele dedicar más de las diez páginas que como mucho se le han venido otorgan-
do en los manuales de historia militar de la Grecia clásica. Una vez solventado el problema del vocabulario, y 
conociendo la diferencia exacta de significado entre términos como τ στρατπεδον, τ πλα o σκηνω, 
hemos podido aproximarnos a la teoría castramental griega del s. IV tal y como pudo aparecer en obras hoy per-
didas como la de Eneas Táctico. La castramentación griega parece haber alcanzado un alto grado de profesionali-
dad, con campamentos que mostraban un plano y una estructura interna regular, con un sofisticado sistema de 
guardias, y un horario que demuestra la preocupación de los generales por el mantenimiento del orden y la disci-
plina entre la tropa. Dentro del campamento era la συσκηνα (el grupo de soldados que comparten una misma 
tienda) la unidad logística (y, probablemente también, táctica) básica en los ejércitos griegos en campaña. 
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It is very surprising to discover how little attention has been given to the Greek military 
camp from the time it is first mentioned in J.Potters´ work (Potters, 1776: 156-155) in the 
18th century until the present day. Although in recent years some important authors such as 
W.K. Pritchett (Pritchett, 1974: 133-146) or J.K. Anderson (Anderson, 1970: 59-66) have 
devoted whole chapters to this issue in more general works on war in Classical Greece and 
there has even been a tentative attemp to introduce it as a new area in archeological research 
(cfr., McCredie, 1966), the necessary monographyc treatment has never really been under-
MAURICIO G. ÁLVAREZ RICO 
 
30 Gladius XXII, 2002 
taken. Any attempt to produce a bibliographical review of the Greek στρατπεδον should 
have paid more attention to authors who have never investigated the subject —so we have 
important omissions such as F.E. Adcock, D.W. Engels, G.T. Griffith, R. Lonis, G.B. Nuss-
baum or A.M. Snodgrass—, than those who have. In some of the more important works of 
general history such as the Realencyclopädiae der classischen Altertumswissenchaft or the 
Dictionnaire des Antiquités Grecques et Romaines the headword stratopedon does not ap-
pear. The first offers only a few lines about it in the article under the headword «Krieg-
kunst». In the second work, we find a short description of the Greek στρατπεδον in the 
introduction of the entry on the Roman castra. 
The reasons for this absence of works on the Greek military camp are, primarily, in 
Polybius´ Judgement about the Greek style of encampment compared with the Roman tradi-
tion and also in the traditional inertia that sometimes governs classical studies and causes 
authors to accept old ideas uncritically. 
But the study of this question is important, because it seems impossible that such high 
calibre armies as the Greek, and particulary the Spartan army, would have failed to plan this 
very important aspect of military life. Furthermore, we know of the existence in the 4th. cen-
tury B.C. of a military handbook, at least in the form of a draft, dedicated to the 
στρατπεδον, written by Aeneas Tacticus (cfr., Aen.Tact., XXI, 2). The attention devoted 
by Xenophon to it in all his literary works, —particullary in his Lacedemonian Republic and 
Cyropaedia—, also invites a more careful reflection on the subject. The results of such a 
study of the Greek army issue is only one of the possibilities confronted by this research. It 
could be also of great interest for understanding the process of Greek urbanism and colonisa-
tion and gaining a better understanding of the continuity between Greece and Rome. This 
research covers classical society as a whole. 
Our choice of Xenophon as the main source of our work is not a casual one. No other au-
thor has described military life in the 4th century B.C. as well as he has. Not only did he dis-
cuss the ars military, but also he considered the duty of a good commander to look after 
every aspect of daily life of the soldiers under his command (cfr., Cyr., I, 6, 14; Mem., III, 1). 
Everything is coordinated within the framework of the military camp. Before Polybius he 
was the Greek author who showed most interest in life on campaign. 
The Anabasis has proved to be the most rewarding source for our study. It was written 
from the author´s personal experience of the events that occurred during the March of the 
Ten Thousand. The account thus gives us a view of the daily life of Cyrus´ mercenaries and 
his military camp. Indeed this work became the most suitable, worthwhile and accurate sour-
ce for the subject of this research. 
Due to the limitation of Xenophon´s works, our conclusions cannot be generalised to ap-
ply to the 4th century as a whole. His moral and didactic interests led Xenophon to select the 
events he included in his works and obligue us to be cautious about general conclusions until 
we have studied more classical authors. In this work we have only used other classical writ-
ers when it was very necessary and in support of some inferences presented here. But we 
have not used other authors as the basis of our argument. We have taken the view that any 
conclusions must be supported by Xenophon´s testimony; he was very subjective, but had 
extensive experience and knowledge of the subject. His account does not reach the depth or 
accuracy of Thucydides, but we must recognise that no-one has described the hoplites´ethos 
better than him. 
This article is a necessarily very brief summary from our dissertation, a thesis project en-
titled: «Military camps and history of war in classical Greece (490-336 b.C.)» supervised by 
Mr. Víctor Alonso Troncoso (Professor and Head of Departament of Classical Studies of the 
Universidad de La Coruña) and Ms. Alicia Canto y De Gregorio (Reader of Archaeology of 
the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid). The principal object of our study was to demonstrate 
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that the Greek military camp could get more than the paltry ten pages normally devoted to it 
in the classical military handbooks. 
 
 
2.  CASTRAMENTAL VOCABULARY USED IN XENOPHON´S WORKS 
 
At the beginning of our work, we realised that it was necessary to make a philological 
study of Xenophon´s castramental terminology. Every piece of research is faced with the 
obstacle of lack of agreement among the translators as to the interpretations of terms such as 
τ στρατπεδον, τ πλα or σκηνω in the contexts of Greek castramentation. This has 
been solved by using generic forms, a very inadequate solution when undertaking a 
monographic study of the subject. Moreover, this situation has led to a misunderstanding of 
the texts, and hindered any advance in the research of Greek στρατπεδον. In this second 
section, we have tried to resolve this problem of vocabulary. 
Xenophon uses five terms when he refers to military camps or the action of setting up 
camp: τ στρατπεδον, σκηνω (as a verb, and as a plural noun, σκναι), τ πλα, 
αλζοµαι and στρτευµα. All of them are treated in the dictionaries as equivalents and 
translated as «military camp» or «encampment». 
Τ στρατπεδον is the main object of our study and standard term used in Xenophon´s 
works to refer to a military camp. In Liddell-Scott´s Greek-English Lexicon this noun is defined 
as «camp», «army», «fleet» and, in Roman times, «legion». We can find all these different 
meanings in the various translations of Xenophon´s works1. D.Roques, in his research on Hero-
dian´s political vocabulary, says the substantive τ στρατπεδον is a vague and polysemic 
term, which depends very much on the translator for its meaning (Roques, 1990: 65). 
When we look at the way Xenophon uses this word, we can realise that the existence of a 
στρατπεδον does not depend on having defensive construction (τφρον κα σταρωµα)2. 
If this is the case, Xenophon speaks about a camp sorrounded by an entrechment3. It is not 
necessary to have tents to talk about the στρατπεδον (cfr., HG., VII, 5, 22; An., IV, 4, 8-
22). Even the physical dispersion of troops on account of the distribution of the various army 
groups to different villages does not imply a multiplication of military camps (στρατπεδα) 
and in this case one camp only (στρατπεδον) is referred to because it pertains to only one 
army (cfr., An., IV, 4, 9; IV, 4, 22; IV, 6, 1). Naturally, if there are buildings for the soldiers, 
these would be referred to —through a logical process of assimilation— as a camp, so Xeno-
phon says that Eteonicus sent his troops to Metimna and set fire the στρατπεδον (cfr., 
HG., I, 6, 38). 
In our opinion, the problem of translation rests on our definition of military camp. It 
tends to emphasise the territorial or physical aspect (tents, barracks, fortifications, etc.) of the 
encampment, while for Xenophon, at least, στρατπεδον means first and foremost the 
troops or soldiers, and, by extension, the ground used by them or the buildings in which they 
———— 
 1 Cfr., e.g., HG., I, 1, 3 (translated by Brownson as «fleet»); I, 1, 21 (as «Athenian forces»); I, 2, 7 (as «division» of 
an army). We find the same problem in other authors: F.G. Sturz (Sturz, 1964) presents stratopedon in Xenophon as «castra, 
locus castrorum, exercitus, classis». The more accurate translation in Eq.Mag., VII, 9-10 seems to present a more complex 
picture: «φιλοσι δπωστρατι	ται, σ
 ν πλεουσι, τοσοτ
 πλεω µαρτνειν.  γρ π τ πιτδεια 
πιµελεκεδννυνται  πορευοµνων ταξ µν προρχονται, ο δ πολεπονται πλον το καιρο. τ ον 
τοιατα µαρτµατα ο χρ παριναι κλαστα (ε δ µ, λη  χρα στρατπεδον σται)». 
 2 «When the historians refer to a camp (stratópedon), they habitually mean an expanse of ground occupied by an 
entire army on campaign, regardless of whether or not it was fortified» (Lawrence, 1979: 159). 
 3 Cfr., HG., VI, 2, 23 («τ στρατπεδον σν τ χαρακµατι»); HG., III, 2, 2-5 («στρατοπεδευσµενοι κα 
περισταυρωσµενοι»); An., VI, 4, 1-6;5, 1: the men took up quarters in a very easy natural place to defend, which is 
endowed with ditch and stockade; Cyr., III, 3, 26-28: description of an Assyrian camp sorrounded with ditch (τφρον 
περιβλλονται). 
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lived. When this aspect is understood, τ στρατπεδον is no longer an ambiguous or poly-
semic term and becomes a very accurate concept in the Greek language, although we have 
no direct translation for it. In fact, it is not a term peculiar to the Athenian: Homer also refers 
to the Greek camp in Troy as στρατcfr., Chantraine, 1968: s.v. stratos). 
Neither does Xenophon refer to any military contingent as στρατπεδον. On one hand, 
we should distinguish it from a permament troop settlement used for lookout, siege or harry-
ing operations functions in enemy territory, like the φροριον or τεχο4; on the other hand, 
an establishment taken out of the main army group during a march does not have the level of 
a military camp5. Actually, the στρατπεδον refers only to the troops settled on land around 
his command6 and has no time limit defined by the the fulfilment of a duty. 
The verb στρατοπεδεω is closer in meaning to our verb «encamp», although a more 
accurated definition would be «occupation or settlement in a territory by an army». So, Xeno-
phon does not describe the Cyrus´ camp in Cyr., VIII, 5, 2, but describes how Cyrus organised 
the settlement of his troops; in the same way, Lycurgus (cfr., Lac., XII) does not describe the 
Lacedemonian encampment, but gives some rules about how to encamp, or more in keeping 
with the Greek mentality, how the Spartan army should settle when on campaign (Lac., XII, 1: 
«’Eρ	 δ κα  στρατοπεδεεσθαι νµισε χρναι Λυκοργο	
 
Closely connected with the last verb is ναζευγνω, to refer to the action of «the camp 
moving off», or striking camp. Its original meaning was the action of «harnessing the horses 
or the oxen again», and from this idea comes «the camp moving off» and «getting the army 
ready to go on» (Adrados, 1986). 
The second noun, usually translated as «encamping» is σκηνω, though it has a more 
exact meaning in relation to the common life of the soldiers who share the same tent7 and, in 
general any form of quartering troope8. This term is given a broader meaning with the 
institution of συσκηνα (cfr., Lac., V, 2; VII, 4; IX, 4; XIII, 1; XV, 5), the communal tent 
for meals on campaign, the civilian equivalent of which was the συσστιον (Cfr., Rebenich, 
1998: n. 60). Σκηνω means principally the common life of the soldiers on campaign and 
the comradeship among those who shared the same tent, the smallest logistic (and probably 
tactical) unit in the Greek armies. 
A derivatived form often used is διασκνηω, defined as «scattered encampment», nor-
mally for battalions billeted in differents villages, Xenophon´s expression: «διασκηνσαι 
ττξει	cfr., e.g., An., IV, 4, 8; IV, 5, 23) being typical. 
The third most interesting and problematic term, is «τ πλα». Its etymology as «mili-
tary camp» was explained by J. Classen as Folge des τθεσθαι τ πλα» (Classen, 1963: 
———— 
 4 Φροριον would be the stronghold, because it holds a garrison (φρουρ
φροριον is τεχοr-
ally «wall», but it could be said also to a stronghold that politically is not a city: Oenoe on 431 is a φροριον and on 
411 is appointed as τεχοcfr., Th., II, 18, 2; VIII, 98, 2) (Lawrence, 1979: 159, 172-173). Siege fortifications: τεχο
(HG., I, 3, 14; HG., IV, 4, 16); Watch establishments or garrisons: φροριον (HG., III, 2, 11; IV, 7, 7); stronghold: 
τεχο HG., IV, 8, 25); establishments within enemy territory to serve as a base of operations against the enemy: 
πιτειχισµHG., V, 1, 2). 
 5 For example, An., I, 2, 21-22 (is not a military camp, but only the garrison tents for guarding the Cilician Gates; 
in HG., IV, 5, 3, Agesilaus encamps (στρατοπεδεετο) at the hot springs of Piraeum at Corinth, while he sends a 
company to spend the night on the nearby high places to watch over (νυκτρευσεν) the camp. 
 6 It is the physical proximity to the commander that defines the dependence on this general and the camp: cfr., An., 
I, 3, 7; Cyr., IV, 2, 26. 
 7 Cfr. F.G. Sturz (Sturz, 1964) s.v. σκηνω: «castra locare et ibi commorari; tentoria habere; militare; con-
vivari»; Liddell-Scott, s.v. σκηνω: «to be or dwell in a tent, encamp, also, generally, to be quartered or billeted»; 
σκηνtent; pl. camp». Strack gives the same meaning (Strack, 1971), s.v. σκηνω: «(sich) lagern; übh. sich aufhal-
ten oder Quartier haben (v. Truppen)», adding the other sense of «feasting (schmausen)». In the same way σκην 
translated as «Zelt; Pl. zuw.= das Lager». Sturz offers a thirth form: σκνωµα (=«Zelt; Behausung»). 
 8 The use of σκναι is not ncessary (cfr., e.g. HG., V, 1, 20). 
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289). We can find this same idea directly expounded by Xenophon (cfr., HG., VII, 5, 22; 
Th., IV, 44, 1). 
Once the weapons were set down, there was a camp. Moreover, the modern authors have 
defined this general term in a variety of ways: «weapons stack», «place of arms», «military 
camp» and «quarters of soldiers». But, as in the case of the noun στρατπεδον, it is difficult 
to find the correct translation in each case. For instance, and amongst many other cases, we 
can extract the following text from the Anabasis, II, 4, 15: µετ δ τ δεπνον τυχον ν 
περιπτ






In the opinion of P.Masqueray we should understand «πρ τ	ν πλων» as the «weap-
ons stack». And Brownson translates it in this way: «Proxenus and Xenophon chanced to be 
walking in front of the place where the arms were stacked, when a man came up...». We en-
counter some differences in Bach Pellicer´s translation: «Después de la cena se hallaban 
paseando frente al campamento Próxeno y Jenofonte. Se acercó un hombre...». 
So, there is considerable disparity and we do not know where Proxenus and Xenophon 
were walking: whether they were outside or inside the camp, or somewhere near the camp of 
the Ten Thousand, maybe in a place that was easy for a Greek reader to recognise. 
Among the various possible translations adopted by the modern authors, the identifica-
tion of τ πλα with «stacked arms» supposed to exist in Greek camps, is the most interest-
ing one for our research. If it is correct, it would be important for studying the internal struc-
ture of Greek military camps. The first modern author to make use of this translation was 
H.Droysen in the description of the Lacedemonian camp (Droysen, 1889: 89). F.Ollier sha-
res this opinion in his annotated edition of the same work. He claims that the Greeks had the 
custom of stacking all the weapons together in one or more places in the camp (Ollier, 1934: 
62). This idea appears repeatedly in the translations of Xenophon´s works by the publishers 
Belles Lettres, where, in a note to the Anabasis volume, we can read: «Dans la langue de 
l´Anabase l´expression ta hopla (II, 2, 20; III, 1, 40) désigne souvent, comme ici, une partie 
spéciale du camp où les soldats réunissaient leurs armes avant d´aller se reposer» (Mas-
queray, 1988: 170). 
If we reshift to the Xenophon´s work which this claim is based (cfr., Lac., XII, 2), we 
can see that at no point are stacked weapons mentioned, only weapons. However, the most of 
the translators believe that Xenophon referred to places where the soldiers´ arms where col-
lected. In our opinion, this interpretation was adopted because of the need to explain the ex-
istence of an internal guard stationed «π τ	ν πλων» (cfr., Lac., XII, 2) to avoid weap-
ons being taken by servants and used against their masters (cfr., Lac., XII, 4) and to offer a 
logical interpretation of Lac., XII, 7, normally translated as «rest by the arms»9. 
But this translation has other problems too. The first arises because hoplites had their 
own servants (σκευοφροι), who had to take care of, guard and carry their masters´ weap-
ons, amongst other duties. It is hardly likely or very logical that, when they were encamped, 
the servants would be careless with these special, important and valuable items of private 
property. Besides, in forces of this kind the tent companions seem to have acted as a logistic 
unit and there was no need to think they broke this habit and all the soldiers stacked their 
weapons together10. 
The second objection arises when we look at the text of Lac., XII, 7. The translation of 
«π τ	ν πλων» as «rest by the arms» is a less usual translation of 	 than «on» or 
———— 
 9 «µετ γε µν τατα δειπνοποιεσθαι κηρττεται, κα πειδν "σωσιν ε το θεο ο# ν 
κεκαλλιερηκτεσιν, π τ	ν πλων ναπαεσθαι». 
10 In roman camps there were no arms depots either. Hyginius, 1, says that each Roman had a place at the front, the 
same width and half lenght of the rest of the tent, for the weapons. 
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«over» and not very logical if we accept that in each mora there were common places to 
gather the weapons, because in this case the soldiers had rested in a very small place. 
To clarify the correct interpretation of Xenophon´s text we should quote some lines from 
the Iliad: «Βν δ’ π Τυδε$δην ∆ιοµδεα τν δ’ κχανον κτπ κλισησν 
τεχεσιν µφ δ’ %ταροι ε&δον, π κρασν δ’ χον σπδα γχεα δσφιν ρθ’ 
π σαυρωτρο λλατο, τλε δ χαλκ λµφ’ ' τε στεροπ πατρ ∆...» 
(Hom., Il., X, 150-154). 
As we have just seen, at Diomedes´ camp there was nowhere to stack the weapons, but 
each soldier kept his weapons near him and —as Xenophon does— we could claim that each 
man slept over his arms, using the shield as pillow for his head. 
Another example of what we are saying appears in the Anabasis on the occasion of the 
alliance between the Ten Thousand and the Mossynoecians. Xenophon describes how the 
day after they had taken the oaths, the Mossynoecians came with ships to the place where 
they were encamped. The Greeks were outside the camp waiting to begin the march: «After 
they had formed their lines one of them led off, and the rest after him, every man of them, fell 
into a rhythmic march and song, and passing through the battalions and through the quarters 
of the Greeks they went straight on against the enemy» (translation by C.L. Brownson)11. 
In this case, we must understand by τξειutside the camp, wait-
ing to start the march, as standard practice and as we could also read in HG., IV, 1, 23. So, 
after the Mossynoecians had gone through the Greek formation, they would have crossed the 
camp of the Ten Thousand. It does not make much sense to assume that τ	ν πλων would 
refer to the place where the arms were stacked, when the Greeks were ready to march out of 
the camp, as Masqueray´s translation suggest: «puis, après avoir traversé les rangs des 
Grecs et leur dépôt d´armes...». 
We think that, at least in Xenophon, τ πλα means «military camp», and, specifically 
the idea of proper place or post for each soldier or group of soldiers in the camp corre-
sponding to the site where their weapons are. Some passages of the Anabasis will help us to 
confirm this hypothesis. 
In An., III, 1, 3, Xenophon describes the spirit of the soldiers after the death of the com-
manders in the following words: «π δ τ πλα πολλο οκ (λθον τατην τν 
νκτα, νεπαοντο δ που τγχανον )καστο...». 
Masqueray translates the text as follows: «et beaucoup n´allèrent pas déposer en com-
mun leurs armes cette nuit-là. Ils se couchèrent, chacun où il se trouvait...». And Bach Pelli-
cer interprets it as follows: «Sólo unos pocos al atardecer probaron la comida, y algunos 
encendieron fuego, y la mayoría no acudieron al campamento aquella noche. Cada cual se 
acostaba donde buenamente le cogía la noche». But, in our opinion, Brownson´s translation 
makes more sense: «few kindled a fire, and many did not come that night to their quarters, 
but lay down wherever they each chanced to be...». 
When we think about the setting of this scene, we can exclude Masqueray´s interpreta-
tion that the soldiers would have slept wherever they happened to be at nightfall. Just before 
the assesination of the commanders the situation of the mercenary troops in the middle of 
enemy territory would have made it very dangerous to leave or to sleep outside military es-
tablishment. Also, after the day´s events and with the sense of defeat in the camp, it would 
have been impossible for them to spend the night outside of the military settlement and with-
out seeking their comrades´ protection. In our opinion, Xenophon is trying to express some-
thing different. He wants to convey the discouragement and neglect in the Greek camp that 
night by clearly contrasting this situation —when none of the soldiers took up this post in the 
military settlement, sleeping wherever he happened to be at sunset, but always within the 
———— 
11 An., V, 4, 14: «κα διελθντεδι τ	ν τξεων κα δι τ	ν πλων τ	ν *Ελλνων...». 
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space occupied by the troops (νεπαοντο δ που τγχανον )καστο— and a more 
common situation when calm and discipline reign and everyone sleeps in his proper place 
beside his arms (π τ	ν πλων ναπαεσθαι). 
Then, Xenophon describes the same situation again, but in other words (An., III, 1, 40): 
«νν γρ +σωκα µεασθνεσθε ,θµωµν (λθον π τ πλα, θ
ω
δ πρ τ ϕυλακ	
 
Once again we find different translations: 
 
– Masqueray: «Actuellement, sans doute, vous comprennez aussi bien que moi en quel 
abattement ils sont allés déposer leurs armes, en quel abbatement....». 
– Bach Pellicer: «Porque ahora, posiblemente, os dais cuenta también vosotros de que 
han acudido a las armas con desaliento y sin ánimo hacen también las guardias». 
– Brownson: «in what dejection they came to their quarters and in what dejection they 
proceeded to their picket duty». 
 
Brownson´s interpretation again seems to be the translation that most accurately ex-
presses events in the camp and Xenophon´s intentions, trying to give the reader a clear im-
pression of the state of mind among the Ten Thousands. 
But it is not only in the Anabasis that Xenophon, using the τ πλα term, discusses dis-
cipline problems in the στρατπεδον: «κα ο µν Θηβαοι, που στρατοπεδεοιντο, 
εθ-ν κοπτον δνδρων κατβαλλον πρ τ	ν τξεων , δναντο πλεστα, κα 
ο.τωφυλττοντο. ο δρκδε τοτων τε οδν ποουν, καταλεπντε δ τ 
πλα ερπαγν π τοκατρποντο» (HG., VI, 5, 30). 
It does not make sense that the Arcadians would go off to plunder carelessly leaving their 
weapons behind or that they would consider it unnecessary to carry them during the raid. 
However, that is the translation by Strasburger or Guntiñas Tuñón12. On the other hand, 
Brownson gives us a more logical version: «The Arcadians, however, did nothing of this 
sort, but left their camp behind them and turning their attention to plundering the houses» 
(translation by C.L. Brownson). 
Xenophon was contrasting the discipline and prudence of the Thebans —when every sol-
dier stayed at his proper position, taking all the possible precautions to defend himself in the 
camp— and the lack of discipline and meanness of the Arcadian soldiers, who were solely 
concerned with plundering and robbing the land (cfr., Cyr., VII, 2, 5). We must not forget the 
importance that Xenophon attaches to maintaining discipline among the troops during the 
plundering actions and how he considers this activity as more appropiate to slaves than to 
soldiers (cfr., Cyr., IV, 2, 25). 
From this perspective, we can see also another intention of the references to τ πλα in 
the Lacedemonian Republic text: the sentries in the Spartan camp would been posted at the 
border of the encampment, along the place of the soldiers (cfr., Lac., XII, 2: «π τ	ν 
πλων»); at night, the lacedemonian patrols would have been responsible for keeping the 
servants out of the encampment to avoid any insurrection against their masters (cfr., Lac., 
XII, 4: κα τοδολουε+ργουσιν π τ	ν πλων»), while they were asleep in their 
positions by or on their arms (cfr., Lac., XII, 7). It would also, Lac., XII, 5 be an attempt to 
describe the high level of discipline and order in the Spartan armies during the campaigns. 
They were not permitted to spend the night away from their positions13. The strict character 
———— 
12 This idea is also accepted by V.D.Hanson. He considers that one of the main reasons why the groups of soldiers 
spread out over a territory plundering could so easily be attacked by the cavalry was that they had left their weapons in 
the military camp (Hanson, 1983: 106). 
13 Amm.Marc., XXII, 4, 6 records an ancient Lacedemonian law: the Spartan soldiers on campaign were not allowed 
to spent the night under roof («sub tecto»), which can be understood as the duty to not leave the military camp at night. 
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of this rule would contrast with the lack of discipline in the Athenian army at Catana (cfr., 
Th., VI, 64, 3). 
Summing up, τ πλα seems to mean the place occupied by each soldier in the camp, 
restricted to the area of the tent or each military unit into which the camp is divided. Because 
of this, it is sometimes translated as «camp», but with a more physical and restricted mean-
ing than στρατπεδον. The origin of this expresion would be found in the ancient form of 
encampment, where every soldier would sleep at his post, almost literally, on his weapons. 
When proper campaign tents were used and there was greater organisational complexity in the 
armies, the term would keep its sense as a concept, but not as real form of encampment, with 
the meaning of proper place or post for each soldier or group of soldiers in the camp. Which of 
the two possibilities (singular or plural) is the most correct, it is difficult to say because τ 
πλα appears only in its plural form. In any case, it seems unlikely that τ πλα would be 
indentified with any place in the camps to stack or gather the soldiers´ weapons. 
Finally, we should mention the other two words Xenophon used in connection with mili-
tary camps: αλζοµαι (principally, to bivouac or to sleep in the open air, although it is 
used in a more general way to mean sleeping in any kind of conditions) and στρτευµα (the 
army as a encampment, compared with the personal character of στρατπεδον). 
After a detailed study of the castramental vocabulary used in Xenophon´s works, we 
were able to discern more clearly the distinctions between the different terms used for mili-
tary settlements in the Greek language and reject possible wrong interpretations, wich have 
sometimes caused difficulties for understanding and translating some of his texts. On this 
basis, we were able to approach the study of στρατπεδον in Xenophon´s works. 
 
 
3.  SITTING THE CAMP 
 
First of all, we should ask about the considerations taken into account by the Greeks 
when choosing a site for the camp. There is no proper treatment of this subject among the 
Greek classical writers as there is in some of the Roman authors such as Vegetius (I, 22 y III, 
8) or Hyginius (56-57) when they discuss the Roman castra. On the sole basis of the state-
ments in Polibyus (VI, 42) and Xenophon (Lac., XII, 1), a large number of modern authors 
have considered the defensive elements —to protect the camp and avoid the construction of 
stockades— as crucial in the choice of the place for encampment during a militar cam-
paign14. However, none of Xenophon´s works seems to confirm this idea. In the Cyropaedia 
the criteria included other aspects, such as the healthiness of the settlement (cfr., Cyr., I, 6, 
15; VI, 1, 23) or the fulfilling the main logistical requirements of an army on campaign: wa-
ter supply, abundance of fodder for the beasts of burden and the cavalry, and the necessary 
wheat to feed the soldiers (cfr., e.g., Cyr., V, 4, 40). If we combine all these logistics and 
defensives requirements, we would have the ideal site for settling an army on campaign15. 
The importance of the logistic criterion is easy to recognize from the logic procedure of 
armies living from what they can find from the land. All this aspects are clearly reflected in 
our sources. The Greeks were well aware of the damage done by a στρατπεδον settled in a 
———— 
14 According to McCredie, after considering two Greek 3rd century B.C. military camps, the Greek military forces 
sacrificed all other considerations to obtain good natural protection for their camps (McCredie, 1966: 99-100). In the 
case of the military establishment at Koroni, identified by McCredie, there was no water source for the troops. H. Lauter 
considers that Koroni is not a military camp, but a fortified shelter for the Athenian citizens, due to the reinstatement of 
the Greek democracy in Athens on 287 B.C. (Lauter, 1992: 78-79). 
15 Cfr. Veg., I, 22, 1: «(“In qualibus locis constituenda sint castra”) Castra autem, praesertim hoste uicino, tuto 
semper facienda sunt loco, ut lignorum et pabuli et aquae suppetat copia et, si diutius commorandum sit, loci salubritas 
eligatur».  
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territory. We can remember here the account of Polyaenus (II, 1, 21) about how Agesilaus 
kept changing the encampment sites as a mean of devastating the countryside of his enemies. 
This same process is explained by Xenophon in his Lacedemonians Republic: «The camp is 
frecuently shifted (by the Lacedemonians) with the double object of annoying their enemies 
and of helping their friends»16. V.D. Hanson considers also the settlement of fortified mili-
tary camps as a tipycal form of devastating fields in classical time (Hanson, 1983: 25-28). In 
many cases, the forces only began their destructive efforts once the camp had been con-
structed and could offer them the necessary security. However, unlike the Romans, the 
Greeks did not carry with them the stakes for building the palisade to defend the camp, so 
trees and vegetation become the first targets for the troops who used them for fortifying the 
στρατπεδον. 
In Anderson´s opinion, this continuous movement of the camp´s position should be re-
lated with health measures, which were taken to avoid the accumulation of excess dirt and 
garbage in the settlement (Anderson, 1970: 161). The sanitary criteria —also mentioned in 
the Cyropaedia— are, in Breitenbach´s opinion, a response to a medical work, for instance, 
the Corpus Hippocraticum (Breitenbach, 1950: 73 and n. 10). These principles were not new 
among the Greek generals and would be considered by each commander. They would use 
them for their own benefit and to take advantage of the enemy. Polyaenus (II, 30, 3) gives us 
a very clear example of this last possibility. It is what Anderson considers the first example 
of bacteriological warfare in History (Anderson, 1970: 61). A wrong choice of camp posi-
tion, for instance, would be the Athenian settlement in Sicily, sited on marshy land in the 
middle of the summer, which caused the illness and death of some soldiers, so the army had 
to find a better site (cfr., Th., VII, 47)17. These principles were also usually remembered in 
the foundation of colonies and cities (cfr., Str., VI, 2, 4; Arist., Pol., 1327a; 1330a). 
The other main goal when choosing a site for the troops to make camp was defence: the 
proper use of topographic peculiarities. Topographical features should be used by the gener-
als as much as possible: the adventage of a secure hill, or wall or a river, afforded protection 
at the rear of the camp (cfr., Lac. , XII, 1)18. 
The most common practice seems to have been the settlement of the soldiers on a slope 
or on the top of a mountain. The advantages of this choice are easy to understand: a higher 
position would be very useful against possible enemies who came from the valley or the 
plain, where the traditional hoplite combat took place. But there were also disadvantages and 
dangers: if the troops were settled on the top of a hill, the soldiers could be encircled and 
besieged, and, could therefore have great difficulty getting food and water (Cfr., An., VI, 3, 
6-9); If the camp was on the slope of the hill, the enemy forces could take higher positions 
and the settlement would either be exposed to attack by enemy hoplite formation, or could 
become an easy target for the peltast and enemy bowmen placed in that higher position. But 
this seems to have been the normal practice and the drawbacks were overlooked (cfr., HG., 
IV, 6, 7;VI, 4, 4 and 14; VII, 5, 22; An., VII, 4, 11-12; VII, 4, 13). 
Either a fight against lightly armed troops was probably not expected to happen or, as we 
shall see, the generals did not consider the possibility of a direct attack against the camp with 
the intention to taking it. In their tactical expectations, traditional combat was more probable: 
in open field and between hoplite formations. The capture of the troops´ camp would be the 
———— 
16 Lac., XII, 5: «Μεταστρατοπεδεονταγε µν πυκν κα το σνεσθαι το πολεµου)νεκα κα το 
/φελεν τοφλου	
Cfr., Cyr., III, 3, 23. 
17 Alexander the Great seems to have been farsighted in this aspect when according to Arrian´s account (An., VI, 
25, 6) he always places his camp 20 stadia far away from water supply to avoid illnesses among the troops due to 
drinking water too quickly. For the Roman practice, cfr., Veg., III, 8. 
18 «∆ι µν γρ ττ γωνα τοτετραγνου χρστου ε0ναι κκλον στρατοπεδεσατο, ε µ ρο
σφαλε+η  τεχο ποταµν πισθεν χοιεν». 
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outcome of defeat in the battle field. Following this type of war, the settlements of troops on 
the hillsides was the best tactical option. In the event of fighting against another phalanx, 
they could count on the site having the advantage of a slope to bring more power and push 
its formation19. Bearing in mind the dangers of this situation, Xenophon´s recommendation 
to find a secure hill (ροσφαλLacedemonians Republic 
is not purely rhetorical. 
Another way of protecting the camp was to use walls or rivers to defend the rearguard 
(cfr., Lac., XII, 1). Those elements allowed the army to focus its defensive efforts on the 
other sides of the encampment (cfr., Hdt., VII, 208). Reference is probably being made here 
to the custom of employing the temple´s τµενο or when the army is grounded at gymnasya 
(cfr., HG., I, 3, 7; II, 2, 8; IV, 1, 41; V, 2, 5; VI, 5, 27). Furthermore, Xenophon always ar-
gued in favour of seeking the element of surprise and concealed places to encamp, consider-
ing them to be a feature of great value (cfr., Cyr., III, 3, 28). 
The proximity of the military establishment to villages and cities was other quite impor-
tant factor when choosing a place to encamp. In the Anabasis, the stages of the Greeks´ pro-
gress is described in terms of the forces halting at different villages. They offered an excelent 
opportunity to satisfy the logistic requirements of wheat, forage, water, wine and other goods 
taken as booty. In the case of cities, the army could stay for longer and take the opportunity for 
other important activities such as reviewing the troops (Cfr., An., I, 2, 4; I, 2, 6; I, 2, 7; I, 2, 14), 
celebrations and the purification of the army (An., I, 2, 10; IV, 8, 25; V, 5, 5; V, 7, 35), selling 
the booty (An., V, 3, 2; VI, 6, 38), or sharing out the profits (An., V, 3, 4; V, 7, 34). 
But one question remains: Whether the soldiers were quartered near the urban settlement 
or actually in the houses. Many writers claimed that the Greek troops were generally billited 
in houses, particularly in the case of the Army of the Ten Thousand. The soldiers would have 
resorted to a bivouac or a tent only when there was no other solution20. But we have some 
difficulties in accepting this opinion: 
 
– Quartering soldiers in houses would have made it necessary to use more than one vil-
lage to ensure the billeting of an army of many thousand men, apart from their ser-
vants, baggage and beasts of burden, as was usual among Greek forces. Only in cases 
of quartering in big cities or if there were several villages near to each other, could we 
accept this possibility. 
– From the legal point of view, it could be taken as an belligerent act, resulting in hostile 
relations between the community and the the military forces. Incidents of abuse or pil-
lage could break out when troops were quartered in villages or houses, and result in the 
enmity of the population (cfr., e.g., An., IV, 1, 8-9; 4, 8-14). Foreign forces are always 
compelled to stay outside the walls sorrounding cities (cfr., e.g., An., VII, 1, 39, 2, 21). 
– Obtaining supplies always followed the hospitality and commercial custom: the host 
allowed the foreign force to settle in this countryside, demonstrating acceptance 
through hospitality presents and opening a market-place where the soldiers could ob-
tain provisions at good prices controlled by both parties (cfr., An., I, 5, 12). The host 
was also obligued to allow sick soldiers to rest in city houses, but only for the time 
necessary to recover from illness (An., IV, 8, 22-V, 2, 32). In positive situations, the 
city would open its gates during the day to the troops camped on its territory21. The ab-
———— 
19 Cfr., Liers, 1895: 148; D.S., XV, 32, 3; 34, 1. The greater the use of peltast and light armed forces, the more 
dangerous the choice of hills for striking camp. We find the final step of this development in Vegetius, I, 22, 2: «Caven-
dum etiam, ne mons sit vicinus aut altior locus, qui ab adversariis captus posit officere». 
20 Cfr., Berve, 1926: 174; Liers, 1895: 152-154; Droysen, 1889: 88; Tänzer, 1912: 59-63, although during the pe-
riod before the Peloponesian War, this procedure would not have been common amongst the Greek troops (32-33). 
21 Cfr., An., V, 1, 13; VII, 2, 11; IV, 8, 22, in comparation with An., V, 5, 3; VII, 1, 7, 32. 
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sence of conflict was guarenteed by a balance of fear between the population —afraid 
of incidents when there were a great number of soldiers at its gates— and the foreign 
army —which needed to obtain the supplies without fighting for them—22. The whole 
of Anabasis confirms this thesis. 
 
Moreover a custom of quartering the στρατπεδον in houses would have been a very 
dangerous situation for an hoplite army, whose chances of success in combat depends on 
mantaining its formation. Fragmentation of the army (διασκηνω) would have represented 
enormeous danger and have undermined its capability for combat. The operations described 
in the Anabasis as in the other Xenophon´s works also demonstrate this logic (cfr., e.g., 
An., IV, 4, 18). 
The few cases where we are sure troops were quartered under a roof were the result of 
exceptional situations due to difficult weather conditions or urgent defense requirements. 
The generals distributed the troops and allowed their soldiers to stay in houses, in villages or 
cities, but the practice resulted in the enmity of the citizens (cfr., IV, 4, 6-22). In any other 
situation we must assume that these settlements always consisted of a camp near the villages, 
but the troops were not billeted in houses. 
Another element to bear in mind in connection with mutual distrust between the popula-
tion and the army, was the longer or shorter distance between the urban center and the 
στρατπεδον, balancing the adventages of easy access to the market-place and the security 
of the population23. The distance between two military camps provides us with information 
about the kind of relationship between armies and also the confidence on their relations. 
Xenophon formulates this principle in An., III, 1, 28 as barometer to measure the good will 
between two armies (cfr., Th., IV, 125). 
 
 
4.  THE LAYOUT OF THE MILITARY CAMP 
 
Στρατπεδον refers principally to the troops that comprise a camp, but here we shall try 
to answer the following question: Whether the layout of the camp normally adopted a stan-
dard form or forms that can be considered typical of the Greeks. 
Few modern historians have examined this matter, and their silence can be interpreted as 
recognition of the impossibility of saying anything about it or even the non-existence of an 
accepted form for the στρατπεδον. In the opinion of some authors, however, the Lacede-
monians´ camps were round in view of their professional approach to military matters (cfr., 
Lac., XII, 1). 
The avalible sources that might clarify this cuestion are very limited. First of all there is 
Polybius, VI, 42, 3-4, with a text taken by many modern authors as the definitive evidence 
for rejecting any regularity in Greek camps. However, the evidence of Polybius is not reli-
able at all, even when we talk about the Roman castra. It is true that the outline of the two-
legion consular military camps could be described as square or almost quadrilateral, but in 
Augustus´ time most of them were completely irregular or had a regular and irregular layout 
at the same time24. This premise is important to evaluate the evidence in Polybius about the 
Greek form of camps accurately. But it is also true that Polybius´ major concern in this text, 
———— 
22 Cfr., An., IV, 8, 8; V, 5, 18; V, 1, 13; VI, 2, 46; HG., II, 1, 1; An., IV, 8, 22-V, 2, 32; We find the opposite example in 
the relations between the Ten Thousand and the city of Cotyora: cfr., An., V, 5, 6-25. For the legal implications cfr., 
Fernández Nieto, 1975: 188-195 and 231-233. For the different legal procedures to securing provisions for the Ten Thousand, 
cfr., Descat, 1995: 99-108. For the relationship between military forces and cities, cfr. Alonso Troncoso, 1987: 97-101. 
23 It is a very important tactical element as we can see in HG., II, 1, 22-26. 
24 Petrikovits, 1975: 139; Lenoir, 1986: 329-330. 
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was the regularity and distribution system of the different elements and groups of a land 
force within the camp, with the aim of maintaining order and discipline among the troops. 
He did not discuss the shape of the camp, but the arrangement of military settlements25. 
The other statement about this problem comes from Xenophon, who in Lac., XII, 1 asks 
which is the best shape for a camp, circular or quadrilateral, resolving the problem in favour 
to the circular due to its defensive advantages. This was the form adopted by the Lycurgean 
Sparta, showing once again its superior intelligence in military matters. Naturally, it was the 
form assumed by Cyrus to settle his army in the Cyropaedia (VIII, 5, 1-16). 
Actually, neither Polybius nor Xenophon dealt with the question of whether military 
camps should have regular outline or not. Both authors seem to have assumed that the camp 
should have a regular shape. Polybius´ text does not look at this problem, but at the internal 
arrangement of the various elements of the army in the plan of camp, while Xenophon in his 
Lacedemonian Republic tries to solve the problem of the best shape for the στρατπεδον, 
circular or quadrilateral, and coming down in favour of the first. We should remember that 
among tha castramental traditions that may have had most influence on Greek culture (Per-
sian, Assyrian or Egyptian) we can see both circular and quadrilateral layouts (the latter also 
included the square and the rectangle). 
Another reference to the shape of Greek στρατπεδον is found in Thucydides, during 
the Athenian campaign at Syracuse, when he mentions a circular camp in the Epipolae26. If 
we take the reference to τν κκλον for the Athenian camp, used as base for building the 
walls to lay siege to Syracuse and not the walls themselves, it is a question solved by E. 
Odermann. Besides, it seems clear that we are dealing here with a fortified military camp, 
and not with a φροριον or some other kind of fortification, thanks to the statement of Plu-
tarch, who referred to this construction as στρατπεδον (cfr., Nic., XXIV, 1). Odermann 
compared this Athenian form of camp with the reference to the circular Spartan military 
camp quoted by Xenophon (cfr., Lac., XII, 1) and considers this kind of layout to be a typi-
cal Lacedemonian form, occasionally used by the Athenians, who would have copied it on 
this occasion (Odermann, 1927: 42-47). 
Indeed, we have no reason to think that this was an exceptional form among the Athe-
nian troops. Quite the opposit: since Thukydides only mentions the shape of the military 
camp, and Plutarch did not say anything about it being a particular Athenian military tradi-
tion, it seems possible that a circular camp, if not usual, was not particularly odd in the 
Athenian tradition. But the lack of more references to the typical layout of an Athenian camp 
means we are unable to reach a more definite conclusion. 
In relation with the elements that defined the space of a camp and its shape, we must 
mention as possibilities the existence of palisades (though it was not a necessary element for 
the Greek camp), the lines of guards in the camp (at night with fires on the perimeter of the 
camp), or a low protective wall that did not become a palisade, as mentioned by Philo By-
zantius (IV, 6, 10). 
Considering the few sources on the subject, it would seem sufficient to accept that the 
Greeks normally adopted a regular layout when they camped and the site permitted, the main 
problem of the military theory at this time being the best shape for the camp, circular or 











26 Cfr., Th., VI, 98, 2; VI, 99, 1 and 3; 101, 1; 102, 1; VII, 2, 3; and maybe, also, VII, 2, 4. 
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5.  PALISADES AND CAMP DEFENCES 
 
The question of whether palisades and defensive constructions existed has been the most 
discussed aspect of the Greek military camp, but there is as yet no generally accepted answer 
to it27. We do not pretend to offer a definitive answer here, but only to look at Xenophon´s 
view of this matter. First of all, it is necessary to remember once again that the concept of 
στρατπεδον does not in itselfs imply the existence of defensive constructions. Xenophon 
always speaks about a στρατπεδον that is endowed with defences, palisades, walls or dit-
ches (cfr., e.g., HG., VI, 2, 23). In the same way, the walls fortifying a Greek city were not 
the first element of the polis, but were devoloped from the inside to the outside, with the 
citizens as its fundamental element. The Greeks did not give to the walls either the essential 
military value they had in the Roman castra or the religious significance of the cities in Ori-
ent or in the Etruscan world (Garland, 1974: 87). 
Xenophon does not defend the construction of walls or ditches to guard the camp. In his 
description of the Spartan στρατπεδον there is no kind of fortification. The only protective 
elements would have been those existing in the field (a secure hill, wall or a river; cfr., Lac., 
XII, 1) and, more importantly, the use of guards and lookout systems. Neither do we find 
defensive structures to protect Cyrus´ troops in the Cyropaedia. Defence was achieved by 
distributing the different elements of the army according to their capacity to respond to an 
unexpected attack from the enemy: a line of hoplites should be established outside the camp, 
making a defensive wall with their shields; behind them, the peltasts and bowmen; and in the 
centre of the camp, the cavalry, which was the group of soldiers that needed most time to 
prepare, for which reason they were the most vulnerable when they were encamped (cfr., 
Cyr., VIII, 5, 8-14). The security system should always be completed with guards, lookout 
posts and the choice of concealed places for the army to camp. 
But Xenophon advocated a defence system without palisades and walls not through igno-
rance of these entrenchment systems. In fact, the Asian Minor campaigns and leading the 
Ten Thousands brought Xenophon briefly into contact with the typical Persian defence of 
walls and ditches. We can confirm his familiarity with this type of defence in his works. This 
experience led him to support the active defence of an army camped in the field, avoiding the 
passive protection of walls and ditches. 
In the Anabasis we find only one example of fortifying a Greek camp, and there is no 
reason to think that the Greeks normally made an entrenchment when they encamped, due to 
the conditions in which they would have been marching (cfr., Pritchett, 1974: 141). This singu-
lar event happens during his stay at Calpe and was motivated by the need to find a site for the 
impedimenta that was easy to defend, when part of the army had to take on Farnabazo´s forces, 
which were in the vicinity (cfr., An., VI, 5, 1-4). It played no part in the military action. Its iso-
lated mention in the whole narration seems to confirm its extraordinary character. 
But we can find examples in the Anabasis in which the Greek forces were confrontated 
with defensive walls and ditches, e.g., the attack against the Drilae´s fortified metropoli 
(χωρον) (cfr., An., V, 2, 3-27). This is a good example of the dangers faced by the hoplites 
when they were confined in a fortification and could not present their phalanx. Xenophon 
had to find a solution to avoid the danger for his soldiers of being caught in the city´s stock-
ade as if it were a jail. He resolves the problem by setting the Drillas´ houses on fire and 
drawing out the palisade, allowing the hoplites to manoeuvre in open ground (other example: 
An., VII, 4, 12-19). In the Anabasis, the use of ditches and entrenchments by Xenophon´s 
forces was reduced to situations of great necessity, due to the perils of their use. Any wall, 
ditch or entrenchment is seen as a limitation for the movements and deployment of the hop-
———— 
27 Cfr., Liers, 1895: 151-154; Pritchett, 1974: 146; Anderson, 1970: 61-63; Bauer, 1893: 318-319, 439 and 457-
458; Berve, 1926: 174. 
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lite soldiers, who needed an open field to maintain their formation and the mobility that 
would ensure their efficacy and strenght. 
For the same reasons, the tactical evaluation of the entrenchments in the Hellenicas was 
not high. We can mention, because of its dramatic character, the assault on the Odrysians´ 
fortified camp. A great number of the Athenian hoplites died under the fire of the lightly 
armed Bithynians while they were guarding the camp, trapped by the defensive walls as if 
they were in a jail (cfr., HG., III, 2, 3-4). 
All these experiences were remembered by Xenophon when he wrote his Cyropaedia to 
demonstrate the best tactics to adopt in each type of situation28. But this work never refers to 
the construction of a fortification for Cyrus´ troops, which was the most usual form of de-
fence among the barbarians. According to Xenophon´s account, the barbarians had three 
reasons for building entrenchments in their camps: 
 
– Their forces consisted basically of cavalry, the military unit least suited to responding 
to surprise attacks against the camp (cfr., Cyr., III, 3, 26-27). This problem was re-
solved by Cyrus by putting them in the centre of the camp and defending them with 
hoplites (cfr., Cyr., VIII, 5, 8-12). 
– The existence of a large number of servants in their armies to built the entrenchment 
(cfr., Cyr., III, 3, 26), although Xenophon does not appear to be consistent, if we re-
member that he claims the Ten Thousand needed only one day to build the whole en-
trenchment at Calpe (cfr., An., VI, 5, 1). 
– The Assyrians assumed that having a position in an entrenchment enabled them to 
choose the best moment to attack (cfr., Cyr., III, 3, 27). But Cyrus saw the situation 
very differently: since the Assyrians were confined in the fortification, he could decide 
when to attack and how many enemy troops to take on, because the troops inside a for-
tification need longer to go out and get into formation than an army in open field (cfr., 
Cyr., III, 3, 46-47; IV, 1, 18). 
 
As we have seen, in Xenophon´s opinion, the use of entrenchments made no sense be-
cause he always argued in favour of traditional warefare between two hoplite forces in open 
field. The fortification was only an emergency shelter, which could also be used to the en-
emy´s advantage in the event of combat between two hoplite formations29. 
With all these precedents, and knowing the Athenian´s didactic intention, it is not sur-
prise that he does not mention palisade constructions in his description of Iphicrates´ camp 
(cfr., HG., VI, 2, 27-31; 33-34), as would seem to be the Athenian general´s ususal prac-
tice30. On the contrary, Xenophon pays more attention to the lookout systems used by 
Iphicrates as an active method of defence. 
To sum up, Xenophon rejects the use of entrenchments to protect the camp as useless or 
even something that could be dangerous for his own army. Despite this, we are not claiming 
that Greeks camps were unfortified in the 4th century. On the contrary, all the evidence 
seems to suggest that at this time some Greek generals systematically employed this kind of 
defence. But in this discussion, Xenophon questioned those practices on account of his ex-
———— 
28 Cyrus built and organised the φροριον (cfr., Cyr., III, 2, 11; III, 3, 1); assault of the Assyrian fortified camp 
(Cyr., III, 3, 26-28; III, 3, 60-70); taking an unfortified military camp (Cyr., IV, 2, 32-33). 
29 «The early hoplite army did not, in battle, rely upon the moral and material support of a fortified camp which is 
so prominent in Roman warfare. We are not well informed for the fourth century» (Adcock, 1957: 8). 
30 Cfr., Polyaen., III, 9, 17; Plu., Moralia, 187a; in the fourth century the Theban Epaminondas seems to have used 
fortification systematically for his encampments (cfr., HG., IV, 5, 30). In the thirth century it is usually accepted that 
fortifications were habitually employed in Greek camps, in contradiction with the Polybius statement in VI, 42 (cfr., 
Pritchett, 1974: 135; Liers, 1895: 151-154). 
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perience during his Asia Minor campaigns against Persian armies that always adopted this 
method of defence. The controversy could be considered part of the more general debate 
about the best way of defending Attic territory, between those who supported actively de-
fending the land and those who favoured a passive guard within the walls of the city (cfr., 
Oec., 6, 6-7; Mag. Eq., 7, 3-13; Vect., 4, 43-48). Xenophon would probably have accepted 
Plato´s saying: «καλ	µν κα 2 ποιητικπρ ατ	ν λγοµνεται, τ χαλκ1 
κα σιδηρ1 δεν ε0ναι τ τεχη µ1λλον  γινα» (Lg., 778d)31. 
 
 
6.  SENTINELS AND LOOKOUTS SYSTEMS AROUND THE CAMP 
 
The only author who has dealt with the guard and lookout systems systematically is Ae-
neas Tacticus, though he did so in reference to the protection of cities. Xenophon also de-
votes considerable attention to this question, without intending to treat it systematically, but 
filling his works with examples of their use. In both authors, this subject is very closely con-
nected with the study of στρατπεδον (cfr. Cyr., I, 6, 43; Aen.Tact., XXI, 2), although in 
the fourth century it was probably not considered an esential element in the installation of a 
military camp32. 
Xenophon´s texts give us a description of a security system for military camps, arranged 
with guard posts (φλακε(σκοπο
night watches. Guard duty was seen as being active in character and designed to prevent 
strangers entering the camp, while the duties of the lookout posts (σκοπο) was passive, re-
stricted to reporting any sign of enemies approaching the camp. 
First of all, we must distinguish between two types of guard posts: φλακε and 
προφλακε
  t 
of where the troops were settled to control the access of strangers to the camp and was hel-
ped at night by the light of fires33. The second type, the προφλακε
distance from the line of soldiers´ tents, giving the στρατπεδον more space for defence. If 
anybody came near the camp one soldier at the post would report it into the camp, while the 
other soldiers would prevent the intruder advancing further (cfr., Cyr., VI, 3, 9; An., II, 1, 7-
8; II, 3, 1-3). Their form of action was somewhere in between the φλακεσκοπο

We must notice that these advance guards never became a second defence around the camp, 
φλακεπροφλακε!
herwise a great many 
men would have been employed for the same function. The choice between this or the other 
type of sentinel was taken by the generals depending on the particular circumstances and 
interests of the time, although the posting of advance guards seems to be more common during 
the day, while φλακεnight34. If we compare Anabasis, III, 1, 40 with III, 
———— 
31 The poet referred to here is not known to us. He is similar to Alcaeus, fr., 112 (10LP), Aeschylus, Persae, 349, 
Lycurgus, Against Leocrates, 47, or Plutarch, Lyk, 19, 12; on the other hand, Arist., Pol., 1330b. About this controversy 
in the 4th century, cfr., Munn, 1993: 14-15. 
32 Cfr., Oec., XX, 8; An., V, 1, 9 (there are no guards around the camp untill a couple of days after the troops had 
settled); Aen.Tact., XXII, 1 (on the other hand, it was not seen as something necessary). Only Iphicrates seems to have 
methodically used guard and lookout posts systems in his mercenary camps (cfr., Polyaen., III, 9, 17; HG., VI, 2, 29). 
33 Cfr., Cyr., III, 3, 33; IV, 5, 14; An., VII, 2, 17-18; HG., VI, 2, 29; use of fires during the night guard: Polyaen., 
III, 11, 15; An., VII, 2, 17-18 and again in Cyr., III, 3, 25. 
34 We know of only one use of the expression µεροφυλκαcfr., HG., VII, 2, 6), unrelated to a camp, but to the 
daytime guard of Phlius. The existence of advance guard posts (προφλακεCyr., 
III, 3, 25 and III, 3, 28 —both referring to the same stratagem— and in the description of the sentinel system at the 
Lacedemonian camp (cfr., Lac., XII, 1-4), but with some particularities in this latter case that we will explain later. The 
way on which nights attacks on some camps occurred confirms that during the night were no advance guard posts (cfr., 
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basis, III, 1, 40 with III, 2, 1, we can see how the changeover from a night defence system 
with φλακεπροφλακε
 
The static function, as simple advanced lookout of the military camp, made a distinction 
between the lookout post (σκοππροφλακε
σκοπο
to report to the camp when someone tried to approach. On the contrary, the προφλακε
should, first intercept any strangers and prevent them approaching the space accupied by the 
army, and then inform the generals35. We find no reference of both kinds of post guards at 
the same time because of their similar type of action. It is more reasonable when we some-
times find the complementary use of φλακε and σκοπο  
(cfr., Cyr., IV, 1, 1; Eq. Mag., IV, 10). 
In Xenophon´s works we have only two complet descriptions of the guards post system in 
a military camp: the Iphicrates´ camp on the Hellenicas (VI, 2, 27-31) and the example of the 
Spartan in Lac., XII, 1-6. Both examples follow the principles just explained. Only the text 
from the Lacedemonian Republic need some explanations to let a better comprehension36. 
If we follow the interpretations given in the second section about the castramental vo-
cabulary in Xenophon´s works, we will find a simple solution to the possible difficulties. 
The text makes a clear distinction between daytime guard duties (Lac., XII, 1-2 and 6) and 
night duties (Lac., XII, 3-4). The first would consist of a line of soldiers posted on the 
boundary of the encampment («π τ	ν πλων»: Lac., XII, 2) whose particular duty was 
not to look outwards from the lines, controlling the access to the camp, but inwards, in order 
to prevent the possible insurrection of the servants. The external protection was entrusted to 
advance horsemen posted on high places and called προσκοπο (Lac., XII, 6). Their duty 
was to inform the camp of every approach or enemy movements as fast as possible. Natu-
rally they were cavalry troops stationed on high groud places, where they had a panoramic 
view of the surrounding land. 
Night security in the camp was the responsability of soldier patrols, armed with spears 
and stationed on the perimeter to prevent servants or allies entering the space of the Spartan 
soldiers37. Servants and non-Spartan forces would have been forbidden from staying at the 
military camp during the night. 
Allied troops had also their role in the camp security. Compelled to stay at some distance 
from the Lacedemonian soldiers, they were used like night προφλακεs-
tablishment, because of the place where they were posted. If an enemy intended to come into 
the vicinity, these troops were the first line of defence to challenge their advance. They 
would act as the day advance guard posts38. 
As we have just seen, this organisation follows the main general ideas. The peculiarities 
are due to the particular character of the Spartan society with its permanent fear to servants´ 
insurrection. These peculiarities could be summed up as the need to stablish two rings of 
security around the camp: the first one just on the perimeter of the establishment —to watch 
over the servants during the day, and not allow them into the camp at night—, and the second 
one —composed with the advance guard post, day and night— to look out for enemies. 
———— 
e.g., HG., II, 4, 5, where Trasibulus´ men were posted at three or four stadia from the Lacedemonian camp, remaining 
there until daylight). 
35 Cfr., Cyr., VI, 1, 46, in contrast to the action of the προφλακεAn., II, 1, 7-8; II, 3, 1-3. 
36 Ollier, in his annotated edition of this work, states that Xenophon gives us a chaotic view of the guard posts sys-
tem, with unacceptable errors and does not demonstrate the necessary perspective for understanding the sentinel system 
he describes (Ollier, 1934: 62-63). 
37 Cfr., Lac., XII, 4: «κα τοδολουε+ργουσιν π τ	ν πλων». 
38 That is the function doing by the Hyrcanian in the Assyrian army of the Cyropaedia (IV, 2, 1-27), which dis-
plays many similarities with the Sciritae troops of the real Lacedemonian army. 
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We have little information about the number of sentinel posts and the way they operated. 
The little we do know comes from the Aeneas Tacticus´ book and assumes that there were 
many organisational similarities between military camps and walled cities (cfr., Aen.Tact., 
XXI, 2; XXII, 1). 
Between the night and day duties there seems to have no more dissimilarity than a differ-
ent watch word (σνθηµα) (cfr. Aen.Tact., IV, 5-6; An., VII, 3, 34). It is more difficult to 
know the number of shifts that made up the night watch. Many modern authors have consid-
ered three the most usual number, as we read, e.g., on Polyaenus, IV, 8, 4. Although, Arrian 
(An., V, 24, 2) talks about four, what has commonly been considered a transposition of a 
Roman custom to the Alexander´s time. On the contrary A.B.Bosworth claims the night was 
divided into four shifts in the 4th century B.C., one for each three hours of the equinoctial 
time (Bosworth, 1995: 333). In HG., VII, 2, 5-6, Xenophon also says there were four shifts, 
but refered to picket duty in a city, not in a camp, which is also confirmed in Aeneas Tacti-
cus (XVIII, 21). 
Neither can we be sure if the number of shifts was fixed or variable. At least in the Cy-
ropaedia there is a recommendation that the number should be adjusted to the duration of the 
night, particularly if a night march was planned. In this case there would have been more and 
shorter shifts to avoid exhausting the soldier with a long time spent on watch (cfr., Cyr., V, 
3, 44; Aen.Tact., I, 8; XXII, 4-5; XXII, 24-25). 
An essential element for watch duties was designating passwords to distinguish between 
members of their own army from spies or enemies trying to enter the camp39. The question is 
not directly mentioned in any of Xenophon´s works, but we can find many stratagems con-
cerning it on Polyaenus´ work (cfr., e.g., I, 11; I, 40, 3; III, 13, 1; V, 15, 5). Aeneas Tacticus 
also devoted some paragraphs to this question and recommends using passwords that are 
easy to remember, and connected with the enterprises or circumstances concerned40: at the 
battle of Cunaxa, e.g., the Greek watchword was «Zeus Saviour and Victory» and at Thym-
brara «Zeus Saviour and Guide» (cfr., An., I, 8, 16; Cyr., VII, 1, 10; Aen. Tact., XXIV, 16). 
The advance guard post duties seems to have been carried out by groups of soldiers (cfr., 
An., II, 3, 1-2). If intruders were intercepted, one of the soldiers ran to the base, while the 
others remained at the post watching over the enemies. Their type of action would have been 
very similar to the watchmen or σκοπο, which Xenophons says numbered ten (cfr., Cyr., VI, 
3, 12: µα δεκ
"#
guard post. They had to be able to distinguish between incidents that were important and those 
that were not, to avoid any unnecessary alarm among the population (cfr., Aen.Tact., VI, 1). 
The more experienced man should command the post, and he is named by Xenophon as 
σκπαρχοCyropaedia (VI, 3, 5-6 and 12). 
The natural complement of the watches were the patrols (περιοδεαι). It is the subject of 
chapter XXVI in Aeneas´ work. In Xenophon we only have one reference to this activity on 
Lac., XII, 4. We assume that this duties were similar to those of the guards, because Aeneas 
Tacticus deals with the watch and patrol duties as one and both belonging to the military 
camp study41. Maybe there are not mentioned by Xenophon because they played little part in 
the events and would have been taken for granted by the reader. But —not having any other 
information— we can say no more. 
———— 
39 Xenophon gives great importance to the use of spies for obtaining information about the situation and movements 
of the enemy army. In his Cyropaedia he describes a great number of possible methods of spying: the use of observers-spys 
(III, 1, 2), double agents (as Araspas, VI, 1, 31), ambassadors sent to the camp (VI, 2, 2) or slaves (VI, 2, 11). 
40 Cfr., chapter IV (about visual signals or σηµεα), XXIV (σνθηµα or verbal signals) and XXV (physical sig-
nals or sounds to answer, called as παρασνθηµα, and used to prevent panic situations and recognise allies). Cfr., 
Aen.Tact., XXIV, 1; Aen.Tact., XXIV, 14-15.  
41 Cfr., Aen.Tact., XXI, 2; Iphicrates used to employ it at night: cfr., Aen.Tact., XXIV, 16. 
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The weaknesses of the camp security system were also evident to Xenophon. In 
Eq.Mag., VII, 12-14 the fundamental tactical principales to be borne in mind when preparing 
an attack against encamped forces are explained. They could act as a bridge for entering the 
camp territory, remembering the existence of advance guard posts that should be taken first, 
and then attacking the settled taking adventage of times when the soldiers were unarmed. 
These recomendations are estrictily followed in the exemples of assaults on military camps 
in Xenophon´s works (cfr., HG., II, 1, 22-30; II, 4, 4-6; IV, 1, 20-24; VII, 1, 15-16). Xeno-
phon´s reference to speed in setting up lookout posts early in the morning in his description 
of the Lacedemonian establishment (cfr., Lac., XII, 6) to reduce this particularly dangerous 
time for an encamped army, is not a facile statement of the author. 
Even when the attacks on camps had great chances of success, the problem was actually 
the balance between risks and results, which was not always very good. The attack would 
cause the soldiers to flee, abandoning the camp and the possessions, but it never meant a 
definitive victory over the enemy army. They could regroup somewhere else and strike back 
at the troops who were plundering the camp42. Xenophon´s theory for solving this problem is 
explained in the Cyropaedia: the στρατπεδον should be sorrounded at great speed to pre-
vent the enemy fleeing and the plundering should being with strict order (cfr., Cyr., IV, 2, 
32-35; III, 1, 6; VII, 5, 34)43. The secret of the success was summed up by Xenophon in one 
fundamental tactical principle, told by Cambyses: 
 
«Contrive, then —said he— as far as is in your power, with your own men in good order to catch the 
enemy in disorder, with your own men armed to come upon them unarmed, and with your own men awake 
to surprise them sleeping, and then you will catch them in an unfauvorable position while you yourself 
are in a strong position, when they are in sight to you and while you yourself are unseen» (Cyr., I, 6, 35). 
 
7.  INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE CAMP 
 
The modern authors have not dealt with this subject or have claimed that nothing can be 
said about it, firstly, due to the absence of direct statements in the sources, and secondly, on 
account of Polybius, VI, 42, 3-444. However, to judge Polybius´ statement properly we 
should remember the words of Petrikovits (cfr., Petrikovits, 1975: 139), quoted some para-
graphs before, and how Polybius actually talked about a παρεµβολ   
means «military camp», but which was never used by Xenophon. Moreover, Polybius de-
scribed only the internal arrangement in the Greek camps, saying that the Greeks did not al-
ways use the same layout for a camp, as the Romans did. They changed it continuously, to suit 
the terrain. But this does not necessarily mean there was no internal structure to the Greek 
στρατπεδον, which is the topyc we are discussing here. 
The first indication of a possible internal structure of the Greek camps is the incident be-
tween Menon´s and Clearchus´ armies mentioned in An., I, 5, 10-14. Here we read that there 
was enough space between the two encamped contingents to allow each hoplite formation to 
assemble and Claerchus´ Thracian cavalry to move forward against the Menon´s troops (cfr., 
———— 
42 Cfr., HG., IV, 1, 20-24; VII, 2, 5-6; An., IV, 4, 20; particular examples are Aegospotami, where only some soldiers 
were able to flee to the small nearby fortifications (cfr., HG., II, 1, 22-30), and the assault against the Laconian guard at 
Phyle, where more than 120 hoplites died in the following pursuit, but not during the attack itself (cfr., HG., II, 4, 4-6). 
43 Cfr., Pritchett, 1991: 157-160, about the camp as a target for booty. Contrary to Polybius, who describes Greek 
disorder during the raid, Xenophon shows great interest in the Cyropeadia in laying down rules and order for this activ-
ity (cfr., Cyr., IV, 2, 38-47; VII, 2, 5-7). In Xenophon the camp as booty was distributed per tents (cfr., Cyr., IV, 5, 39) 
as it would be a city or village, where it is also done per houses (cfr., Cyr., VII, 5, 35). Xenophon consideres this activity 
to be the province of slaves (cfr., Cyr., IV, 2, 25; VII, 2, 11). 
44 E.g., Pritchett, 1974: 133; Lawrence, 1979: 160-167; Droysen, 1889: 88-90; McCredie, 1966: 96-99. 
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An., I, 5, 13). There was even enough space to let Proxenus stop the combat, interposing 
himself with one hoplite battalion between the two sides (cfr., An., I, 5, 14). 
Furthermore, it can be seen in the Anabasis how the generals set up their quarters at dif-
ferent places within the camp, with their soldiers around them45. The commanders did not 
live in shared quarters, but when a camp was composed of more than one army, the soldiers 
under each commander were kept separate. Each army had to organise itself as distinct ele-
ment within the camp. 
But this principle of order does not seem to stop here. On Xenophon´s description of the 
Lacedemonian camp, he says that the Spartan soldiers were not permitted to leave the space 
of their µρα, were not allowed to be far from their place in the camp (cfr., Lac., XII, 5). 
Therefore in the Lacedemonian camp the soldiers had to encamp in military units, each of 
which had a limitated space which the soldiers could not leave. So, we find here just the 
same principle of internal structural divisions, but now at a lower hierarchical level. The 
question is, whether it was normal practice in the Lacedemonian armies and, if so, whether 
this was the common practice among other Greeks forces too. But in Xenophon´s works 
there is no further indications that would answer this questions. Now Polyaenus, II, 3, 11, is 
the author who can help us: 
 
«παµιννδα Λακεδαιµονοι παρετσσετο. Τ δ µχη καρτερ1 γενοµνη, πολλ	ν 
µφοτρωθεν πεσντων, νυκτφελοµνητ τλοτνκη νεχρησαν π τ στρατπεδον 
)καστοι. Λακεδαιµνιοι µν δ κατ λχου κα µρα [κα] νωµοτα κα συσστια 
στρατοπεδεοντε µαθον τ πλθο τ	ν πολωλτων κα α.τω θυµσαντε  .πνον 
τρποντο. Θηβαοι δ παργγειλενπαµιννδα καταστρατοπεδεειν, ,τυχον )καστοι, 
κα µ ζητεν τολχουµηδ ττξει, λλ ,τχιστα δειπνονταναπαεσθαι, !νδρα 
νδρ κ τ	ν παρντων πιτεδεων παρκσαντα». 
 
This text not only confirms what Xenophon said in his Lacedemonian Republic, but it 
also help us to complet the picture. Contrary to Polybius´ view —supposedly chaotic—, the 
Lacedemonian camp had an internal organisation, following the hierarchical order of the 
army. The internal structure of the Lacedemonian military camp was built up on the internal 
subdivision of the army. 
But the peculiarity of the Spartan nomos justifies the doubt that this was the practice 
amongst the other Greeks. In our opinion, the answer to this question is positive —at least in 
the 4th century—, although we recognise that the evidence is very scarce. The interpretation 
of the last text quoted suggests that both combatants used the same system to organise the 
soldiers when they encamped; but, in this particular case, Epaminondas seems to be clever 
and gives the order to his troops to not follow the usual practice —finding their normal place 
in the camp and into the proper military unit—, but to rest where each of them was at the end 
of the day. 
This is also confirmed on the next stratagem concerning Chares´ army: 
 
«Χρην τ στρατοπδ
 κατασκπουπονοσαε0ναι φυλακν ξωθεν το χρακο
περιστσα, προσταξεν )καστον πιλαµβνεσθαι το πλησον κα µ πρτερον φιναι, πρν 
επεν, τιε+η κα τνοτξεω. ο.τω δ συνβη τοκατασκπουλ	ναι µ δυναµνου
επεν µτε τγµα µτε λχον µτε συσστιον µτε σνθηµα» (Polyaen., III, 13, 1). 
 
This text does not say if Chares´ Athenian army adopted this kind of arrangement when 
they encamped, but it is importat to recognise that both texts refer to hierarchical military 
units in the same context and it seems logical to assume that the latter principle was also 
employed here. 
———— 
45 Cfr., An., IV, 3, 10-14; Cyr., III, 3, 40; Hom., Il., X, 152-153. 
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At the beginning of this section we saw how the different Greek armies in the Anabasis 
were separated when they organised the camp. We should now mention another text which 
suggest that this rule of hierarchical subdivision for setting up the camp could be applied in 
the case of the Army of the Ten Thousand, too (An., III, 1, 32): 
 
«ο δ !λλοι παρ τ τξει ντε, που µν στρατηγ σο ε+η, τν στρατηγν 
παρεκλουν, 2πθενδ ο+χοιτο, τν ποστρ3τηγ4ν, που δ α λοχαγ σο ε+η, τν 
λοχαγν»46. 
 
Does this mean that Polybius´ claim was unfounded, or even untrue, and the Greeks, like 
the Romans, always encamped using the same structure? We think not, and we find an 
answer to this question in Xenophon himself. The only Greek text in which the internal or-
ganisation of an encamped army and how the different military units were arranged into one 
settlement is described directly is the Cyropeadia, VIII, 5, 2-16. Here we find not only 
Xenophon´s military experience, but also different proposals —more or less practicable— 
intended to improve the conditions and the art of war of Greek armies. We should read 
Xenophon´s work with this idea always in mind. Although we know that throughout the 
whole work the Persian element on Cyrus´ army was only the frame of a Greek, even Lace-
demonian, picture, the question of whether the paragraph refers to a Persian camp or not is of 
secondary importance to us. What is really important is to distinguish the true picture from 
recommendations in Xenophon´s work. 
The paragraph in Cyropaedia only considers the arrangement of the way various units 
were encamped. The goals were to obtain greater protection and order in the camp and to 
improve discipline and efficiency among the troops. Xenophon recommends giving each 
kind of military unit a fixed space and place according to its peculiar characteristics within 
the military establishment (cfr., Cyr., VIII, 5, 6). 
These recommendations did not conflict with the distribution according to army, battal-
ion, company, section and tent. Actually, he talks here about the place that should always be 
occupied by each different army unit (cavalry, hoplites, peltasts, bowmen) in the camp. No 
other classical Greek source considers this problem, probably because there was no custom 
for organaising it. But Xenophon recognised the need to improve this situation and made 
proposals for doing so. 
In the absence of any other evidence, the Cyropaedia perhaps describes only Xenophon´s 
proposals, not a real system followed by the Greek armies. Furthermore, as Polybius himself 
says, the Greek system which aims to take advantage of the characteristics of the terrain to 
protect the camp and implied adapting the layout of the camp to each specific situation is not 
compatible with a fixed camp plan. The Greeks sacrificed the adventages of a fixed plan for 
the benefits offered by adapting the layout to each individual situation. However, Xeno-
phon´s idea was quite the opposite: a fixed layout giving priority to order, discipline and 
efficiency when they encamped. Indeed, Xenophon himself agreed with Polybius. 
The solution adopted by Cyrus in the Cyropaedia assumes the creation of a regular form 
of castramentation on which every unit knows where to pitch camp and how much space it 
should accupy. This layout would fulfil the order disired by Polybius and every Roman, and 
would have given the Greeks a practical, single, familiar and unvarying solution (cfr., Plb., 
VI, 42, 5). The Cyropaedia´s proposal is far removed from the later Roman answer to the 
problem. It has the same spirit and form, but lacked the methodical implementation it would 
have in Rome. Some small features were also precursors of the later Roman custom, such as 
———— 
46 «but the others proceeded to visit the various divisions of the army. Wherever a general was left alive, they 
would invite him to join them; where the general was gone, they invited the lieutenant-general; or, again, where only a 
captain was left, the captain» (translation by Brownson). 
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the use of identification banners on each commander´s tent (cfr., Cyr., VIII, 5, 13). But 
Cyrus was still a Greek despite his advanced ideas, and Xenophon himself says the plan was 
used much of the time but not always (cfr., Cyr., VIII, 5, 16). 
We can accept that within the Greek camps each military unit encamped within a well 
defined space and the soldiers of different units did not mix, though this does not mean that 
there was a fixed layout for the camp. There was a plan, but this changed every time. The 
distribution whould have created an internal network of streets with a regularity that we can 
not know. Perhaps we should remember here that Homer says the fortified Greek camp in 
the Iliad was crossed by many streets47. 
Our information about other internal elements in a Greek camp are very scarce. It can be 
assumed that the commander´s tent was in the middle of the camp, as in the case of Cyrus´s 
tent in the Cyropaedia (cfr., Cyr., VIII, 5, 8)48. Also the ground between the Cyrus´ tent and 
the δορυφροι was well established. There was a custom in Greek armies to reserve an 
empty space in front of the general´s tent for use as a meeting place and to set the com-
mander apart from the troops49. 
There is no direct information about such a place during the march of the Ten Thousand, al-
though, a wide space in the middle of the camp is sometimes mentioned. This is where the sol-
diers met, and is on one occasion called as to meson (=centre). It had to be a place large enough 
to hold all the soldiers in the army sitting down (cfr., An., III, 2, 1; III, 1, 33; III, 1, 46)50. 
At least in the case of the Ten Thousand, there must have been more than one of these 
places in the camp and each commander would have been able to gather his troops alone. In 
An., I, 4, 13 Menon summoned only his men, trying to convince them to continue the march 
with Cyrus. But neither in these case nor in other similar instances, does it say where it hap-
pened. In An., I, 4, 13, secrecy was necessary to gain Cyrus´ favour and therefore a principal 
place among the commanders and the control of the mercenary army. So it is reasonable to 
assume that this meeting would not have taken place in the middle of the camp, but some-
where else, probably in the space occupied by the Menon´s soldiers at the camp. The most 
suitable place for it would have been the free ground in front of Menon´s tent, while the 
middle of the camp would have been used only for general meetings. But this is a very diffi-
cult question to resolve, because we do not know if this central empty space was common to 
all Greek military camps or was peculiar to that of the Ten Thousand, due to its particular 
configuration as a union of different armies. 
The choice of when and where to make the encampment was a prerogative of the Spartan 
king among the Spartans or the army commander (cfr., Lac., XIII, 10), and was announced 
with a horn call, just as it was to strike camp or to start marching again51. Establishing the 
camp needed some preparatory works on the ground, e.g., felling trees where the camp 
would be set up (cfr., Polyaen., II, 1, 21). We know, at least in the Spartan army, there was 
———— 
47 Cfr., Hom., Il., X, 66: «πολλα γρ ν στρατν εσι κλευθοι». In An., I, 5, 12 Clearchus decides to cross 
the encamped army of Menon as the quickest way to reach his army. That suggest that the internal distribution of the 
camp of the Ten Thousand was sufficiently regular to create a network of streets. 
48 Cfr., Polyaen., IV, 8, 2, places Alexander´s tent in the middle of his camp; Aen.Tact., XXII, 2-3. 
49 Cfr., HG., I, 1, 30. A general military regulation in the Macedonian army from the end of the Third century, 
found at Amphipolis, has a paragraph entitled «περ στεγνοποα	 
 $$ %-8) concerning the installation of the 
king´s tent. This place should be well established and with guard quarters located on its boundaries («5Οταν δ 
τν φραγµν συντελσωσιν τ′{ι} βασιλε |6 κα τν !λλην σκηνοποιαν κα γνηται διστασι, | εθ το
πασπισταποιετωσαν κκοτιον») (Cfr. Roussel, 1934: 44-45; Fernández Nieto, 1995: 240-242). 
50 When Nussbaum talks about the soldiers meetings, he simply says that they took place with all soldiers sitting 
down unarmed at some appropiate place (Nussbaum, 1967: 55). 
51 The use of the horn and not the trompet for these orders alone is a precursor of the later Roman custom of giving 
each instrument a different meaning. Among the Greek armies, as in Rom, the order to set down the troops or to strike 
camp was made with three calls (Anderson, 1965: 1-4). 
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an official responsible for the baggage section (Lac., XIII, 4: στρατο σκευοφορικο        
!ρχοντε52, but we do not know what his duties would have been while the camp was being 
set up. Bauer thinks this official was responsible for establishing the camp, on the basis of 
HG., III, 4, 22 (Bauer, 1893: 318). However, the subject of this sentence seems to be the 
Persian and not the Greeks53. We have to wait for Hellenistic times —and after Alexander 
the Great— to find a definite reference to one official in charge of the camp or allotting the 




8.  THE GREEK MILITARY TENT 
 
We have just said it is not necessary to have campaign tents for there to be a 
στρατπεδον, but they are its most representative element and provide the typical quarters for 
soldiers on campaign. From the word σκην!&r-
ing of an army on campaign (σκηνω), in houses, ships, tents or any other kind of shelter. 
We know the measurements and characteristics of the campaign tents used by the Roman 
soldiers54, but our knowledge of them in the Greek world is very limited. In Xenophon we 
should interpret σκην !     —which 
served as canvas55—, put up at every stage by the army and taken down again when the order 
to march was given. They must have been very heavy and difficult to carry56. In Alexander´s 
time they had metal spikes, very similar to the ones we have today (Cfr., Arr., An., IV, 19, 1). 
There are some pictures of Greek tents on glasses and pottery (cfr. Daremberg-Saglio, 
s.v. «Tentorium»), normally related to a character in the Iliad57 and displaying a great persian 
influence. They consisted of vertical posts, covered with material and were very oriental in 
appearance, which were greatly admired, and influenced the Greek world. The tents of the 
Hellenistic monarchs were simply copies of the Persian musters and became symbols of ro-
yal power. Here the lord held court and welcomed ambassadors58. 
In the 4th century B.C. the commanders seem to have had individual tents, bigger than 
the common tents and large enough to hold meetings and banquets with other officiers (cfr., 
HG., I, 1, 30; Cyr., IV, 5, 2). There are no reference to the tents of the common soldiers. 
Only in the Cyropaedia does Xenophon describe what he considers to be the necessary ele-
ments for living comfortably on campaign (cfr., Cyr., IV, 5, 39). 
The Greeks could always set aside the tents and sleep in the open air, covered only with 
their blankets (στρωµνα: cfr., An., IV, 4, 11), probably made of wool (cfr., Cyr., V, 2, 15). 
These were kept on sail covers (cfr., An., V, 4, 13) and took up a lot of space in each sol-
———— 
52 Cfr., Cyr., V, 3, 40 which talks about ο !ρχοντε σκευοφροι. 
53 This opinion was shared by Krentz: «This addition (their commander) from the Agesilaos makes the sentence´s 
subject be the Persian commander rather than Agesilaos. The sentence then runs more smoothly and the sense fits the 
location of the Persian camp in III, 4, 24» (Krentz, 1989: 190). 
54 Cfr. Richmond, 1934: 62 for the classical description of a Roman military tent. 
55 Cfr., An., I, 5, 10: the tents were used as improvised raft to cross the river; cfr., Arr., An., I, 3, 6; III, 29, 4; Curt., 
VII, 5, 17-18 for the same method among Alexander´s troops. They are called «keleks», very common on this region till 
the 19th century (cfr., Lendle, 1995: 49, 121; Barnett, 1958: 220-221; Lehmann-Haupt [vol.1], 1910: 340-341). 
56 Cfr., An., III, 2, 7; III, 3, 1: the generals set the tents and carts on fire to make it easier to march. In An., III, 5, 7 
the tents are mentioned again, which must be a lapsus by Xenophon. 
57 In the Greek camp at Troy, the soldiers lived in barracs or shelters (κλισαι: cfr., Eust., Commentarii ad Homeri 
Iliadem pertinentes, I, 185). The ones used by commanders were really palaces; the Poet names as ο0κοδµο
we call «Aquiles´ tent» (cfr., Hom., Il., XIV, 471, 673). It was a place with a stockade, wide enough to keep horses, 
carts and cattle. 
58 Daremberg-Saglio, s.v. «Tentorium». Polyaen., IV, 8, 2 gives a description of Alexanders´ tent. It measured 
100x100 feet, what we could calculate as 100 κλινα (cfr., Ath., XII, 539d; Ael., VH., IX, 3; Plu., Eum., 13); cfr., An., 
IV, 4, 21 for Tiribazus´ tent. 
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dier´s baggage (cfr., Cyr., VI, 2, 30). Straw could be used as a mattress (στιβ: cfr., Cyr., 
V, 2, 15). 
More interesting than the physical construction of the tents was the development of the 
σκην'

soldiers who live in the same tent and eat together is called συσκηνα. Therefore the expres-
sion σσσιτοι59 was sometimes a synonym for them60. 
Xenophon pays great attention to this communal life shared by the soldiers. It is in the 
idealistic, moral and didactic framework of his Cyropaedia that we find the importance of 
this institution for the Greek military life clearly expressed. From the point of view of mili-
tary morale, the close life of the soldiers encouraged them to share knowledge, a spirit of 
conquest and a strong internal solidarity in the army (cfr., Cyr., II, 1, 25; II, 1, 28)61. 
The tent was also important for diplomacy. To share the tent was an expression of good rela-
tions and hospitality that should exist between military men. A clear example is given in Helleni-
cas VII, 1, 38, when Timagoras was put to death on the complaint of Leon that he had refused to 
share quarters (συσκηνον) with him and taken counsel in all matters with Pelopidas62. 
The συσκηνα as military unit was also important for logistics in Greek camps. Xenophon 
also refers to this cooperative action amongst tent companions on logistic and administrative 
matters during the Anabasis: For example, in An., V, 8, 5-7 mentions a muledriver whose duty 
was to carry and take care of his companions´ tools. It seems natural, since they shared the same 
tent, that they would not have dispersed their bagagge, but kept all their belongings together 
during the march creating so that the process of setting up and striking the camp would be easier 
and faster63. On account of the special circumstances of the Ten Thousand, one of the tent com-
panions was in charge of the baggage of all those sharing the tent, thought it was normally car-
ried by slaves or servants. Actually, the tent companions also worked together as a military unit 
in intendency matters in the camp. Like a συσστιον, the tent companions shared their provi-
sions, for which one of them was responsible (cfr., Cyr., IV, 2, 34-37)64. 
Some modern authors have spoken about the possibility that the συσκηνα also played a 
role in the militar organisation, as a basic tactical unit in the army65. However, we have no 
direct example of its tactical use in the fourth century, or of its introduction into the hierar-
chical Greek military order as a special unit66. 
The most similar use in a tactical context was in Polyaenus´ texts referred to above when 
we discussed the internal organisation of the camp. In II, 3, 11, the Lacedemonian troops 
———— 
59 Poland 1932: 1833-1834; Kahrstedt 1932: 1832-1833. This institution was called φιδιτα in Sparta and νδρεα 
in Creta. Belonging to one συσστιον was a necessary condition of holding civil rights. Each member should contribute 
some of his fields to the communal property. 
60 Poland, 1932: 1829-1831. The identification between συσστιον and νδρεα was made by Str., X, 4, 18. He-
siquio (s.v.) treated συσκηνα and συσστιον as equivalent. 
61 An example of difficult life together: cfr., Arr., An., I, 21, 1. About the συσκηνα in civil society cfr., Launey, 
1950: 1001-1036; SEG, II, 60; IG, XII, 2, 640. 
62 Cfr., Polyaen., IV, 8, 2; more normal situation was HG., III, 2, 8. An example of the necessary hospitality in the 
tent is Cyr., II, 1, 30; As a Spartan institution: HG., V, 3, 20. 
63 The same happened among the crew on board ships, cfr., Oec., VIII, 12.  
64 Though it is outside the scope of this study, we should remember how in Alexander the Great´s army, the δεκ
—the most basic element of his military organization— also seems to be used as the basic unit of intendency, as the 
συσκηνα was among the Ten Thousand. Frontinus (IV, 1, 6) says Philipus allowed only one servant for each ten infan-
try men, which seems quite similar to the Anabasis. This suggests that in Philipus´ reform, the δεκ
logistic unit, too. Cfr., Arr., An., IV, 21, 10, where the sharing of provisions in the camp was made κατ σκηνν. 
65 Cfr., Berve, 1926: 175, as supposition following Arr., An., IV, 21, 10; Toynbee (Toynbee, 1969: 369) suggests that 
each νωµοτα would consist of a pair of συσστιαι due to the military character of this institution and the need to keep the 
νωµοτα as the basic element of its structure. Lazenby (Lazenby, 1985: 13) rejected it, because it was not consistent with 
Spartan military organization. Although he accepts the ancient military character of the συσστιον. Launey (Launey, 1950: 
1003) also claims that the συσκηνα was very probably a military unit, following SEG., I, 378 and Berve´s opinion. 
66 In SEG, I, 378 there is a reference to one σκηναρχ$$-I century B.C.). 
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encamped after λχοι, µορα, νοµοτια and συσστιαι; and in III, 13, 1, Chares´ army 
was organised into τξιτγµα, λχοσυσστια. Out of this castramental context, we 
find only one reference to the tent companions as military unit in Herodotus, I, 65, 5, when 
he lists the military subdivisions as νοµοτια, τριηκαδα and συσστιαι. 
The absence of other references to the συσκηνα as a military unit is not difficult to under-
stand on account of the few opportunities for such a small group to undertake any major action 
during the great battles. We should also remember that the basic group of the infantry among 
the Greek armies was the δεκ67, although it is never mentioned in the descrip-
tion of an army´s structure, or during any military events. There is no mention of anything 
smaller than the νοµοτια in the Greek military ordinance of our classical sources. 
If we accept that the συσκηνα had a tactical character, the δεκσυσκηνα would 
have been two terms for the same military unit. This is possible if we accept the texts of Polyae-
nus and Herodotus just mentioned, and if we remember that συσστιον and συσκηνα were 
also synonyms. Actually, it seems very reasonable that the συσκηνα would have had a role in 
tactics, as it did in logistic and castramentation activities. There would have been no sense in 
attaching importance to creating solidarity and comradeship among tent companions if it had no 
use during the combat and in the hoplite phalanx. Therefore, the phalanx would have based its 
strenght on the solidarity and unity of the tent companions. 
The great difficulty in accepting this argument is that δεκ, συσστιον and συσκηνα 
should each have consisted of the same number of soldiers: ten men. We know that the Roman 
military tent was formed by eight soldiers, but we have no sources on this matter for the 
Greeks. In the Lacedemonian Republic the members of the Lacedemonian king´s tent on cam-
paign are listed and there were ten of them68. Xenophon´s idealised view of the uniformity and 
austerity of the Spartan army leads us to assume that he would want to describe it without 
many differences between the common soldiers´ tents and so it too would consist of ten men69. 
But the greatest difficulty appears when we consider the number of members in each 
συσστιον. Most of the modern authors, following Plutarch (Lyc., XII, 2), think that there were 
15 men at each communal Spartan table. Although, as Lazenby has said, we know from Plu-
tarchus that this number changed in the course of Antiquity. We must also remember that his 
works were written four centuries after Xenophon´s times (cfr., Plu., Agis, VIII, 1-2; Lazenby, 
1985: 13). Therefore, the evidence of this author alone can not be used to determine with any 
degree of certainty the number of members of the συσκηνα in the 4th century70. 
Finally we should explain why there might be two terms for the same thing. The answer 
may lie in the way they are used: δεκ!
fighting division, while συσκηνα would refer to a basic logistic unit on campaign. 
———— 
67 Droysen, 1901: 2422; cfr., Robert, 1938: 118-126, about an inscription found at Chios from the end of the 5th 
century, with list of slaves, grouped by dekadas for a military mobilisation. Some examples of possible uses of this unit: 
Cyr., II, 3, 21; IV, 2, 27; VI, 3, 12; VIII, 1, 14. 
68 Cfr., Lac., XIII, 1: the king, one polemarch for each of the six µραι and three µοιοι in charge of the tent´s ne-
cessities. This three µοιοι might be three young Spartans, chosen from among the 300 6ππει
$!!
they were divided into three companies of 100 men, following the opinion of Lazenby (Lazenby, 1985: 53). In Lac., 
XV, 5, two men more are appointed to the royal tent, called «Pythii». But they did not go with the king on campaign 
(Rebenich, 1998: 131-132). On Cyr., II, 1, 26-27, Xenophon speaks about the possibility of grouping one τξι())
men on each tent to assure the control and order over his men. 
69 On Arr., An., IV, 21, 10 the food was distributed by tents, which we can assume held ten men («κα τατα 
δοοκ φασκεν ναλ	σαι τ	ν παρεσκευασµνων τν πολιορκαν οδ τν δεκτην µοραν»). 
70 In Oec., VIII, 13 («πντα οκ ν πολλ τινι µεζονι χρ7 κειτο  ν δεκακλν
 στγ8 συµµτρ
») 
there is a reference to space for ten couchs for communal meals on ships. Once again ten is the basic logistic unit. Some 
authors correct the text as «ν <ν>δεκακλν
...», assuming an error by the transcriber on the grounds that the capac-
ity of a normal dinning room was 11 couches (Pomeroy, 1994: 288-289). However, Pollux (I, 80) also quotes this text of 
Xenophon writing «ν δεκακλν
». Some authors consider the dekakline as a common unit of measurement in the 
ancient world, corresponding to 25 m2 (cfr., McCartney, 1934: 30-35). 
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υσστιον and συσκηνα are probably equivalent terms, but used in different contexts (ci-
vil and military). Accordingly —and though the arguments are not decisive— we think that 
the identification of δεκσυσκηνα can be accepted as very probable and logical: a 
ten-men unit that was the basic tactical and logistic unit in Greek camps and armies in the 
4th. century. 
To close this section, we should mentioned one very singular person: the πρεσβτατον 
π σκην
*acted as visible head of his tent companions in very different contexts, 
having special dignity and duties in relation to the commander of the army (cfr., Cyr., IV, 2, 
34-37)71. The respect and dignity accorded the longest-serving soldier was a common feature 
in Greek armies, and, for instance he had the right to speak first at any military meeting72. 
To sum up we can say that Greek life on campaign seems to have been founded in many 
aspects on the male unity of tent companions (συσκηνα). In relation to the meals, servants, 
provisions and general logistic aspects, the tents seems to have had a great deal of autonomy. 
They probably played a role in the tactical military organisation of the army, too. The soli-
darity amongst the tent companions is a common place on the commentaries on discipline 
and courage in Xenophon´s works. Even in the case of the Lacedemonian Republic, this 
unity of soldiers is compared with the table companions (συσστιον) in Sparta, when it dis-
cusses comradeship, joint action in battle and the discipline required of them as a group. 
Among them there was an hierarchical organisation in wich the oldest man in the tent repre-
sented the others. 
 
 
9.  ROUTINE AT THE CAMP 
 
The daily life at the camp was governed by a routine described by Xenophon in his ideal 
arrangement in the Lacedemonian Republic (Lac., XII, 5-7): 
 
– The firsts activities in the morning were physical exercises, followed by the military 
rewiev carried out by the first polemarch and called by the herald. 
– It was followed by breakfast and the dispatch of advance lookouts. 
– Most of the time of each day was free for recreation and rest before the afternoon exer-
cises. 
– At the end of the journey, the heralds announced dinner and after that, there were songs 
to the gods honoured in the sacrifices. Then the day ended, and everyone slept at his 
post and beside his arms. 
 
That is the basic plan of an encamped army, which must be adapted in many aspects to 
take into account the needs and activities of every military establishment and due to the par-
ticular circumstances of each campaign. However a study of the Hellenicas and Anabasis has 
confirmed this general plan. Even the Persian army in the Cyropaedia seems to have fol-
lowed the daily routine, in form and spirit, too73. 
———— 
71 Perhaps he was the skenarchós that appears on SEG, I, 378. 
72 Cfr., An., II, 1, 10; III, 1, 34; VI, 5, 13; That is the πρεσβτατοτ	ν περ δαµοσαν in the Spartan royal tent 
(cfr., Lac., XIII, 7), too. Maybe he was the first polemarch (Rebenich, 1998: 134). 
73 Sacrificies before breakfast: Cyr., III, 3, 34; IV, 5, 13-18; VI, 4, 1; end of the day: Cyr., II, 3, 1; III, 3, 28; III, 3, 33; 
IV, 1, 17; V, 3, 51; VI, 3, 37; sport exercises: Cyr., II, 1, 29; I, 6, 17; tactical lessons in Cyrus´ tent: Cyr., II, 1, 20-24; II, 2, 
6-10; different games Cyr., II, 3, 17-20; II, 3, 21 (cfr. Plu., Alex., XXXI, 1-2); tactical exercises before dinner: Cyr., II, 3, 
22-24; among the fleets, are naval exercises: HG., I, 1, 16; Plu., Alc., XXIX, 2; among Iphicrates´ troops: HG., VI, 2, 27-31; 
Chabrias: Polyaen, III, 11, 7. 
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The first activity of the polemarches, even before breakfast, was the sacrifices to the 
gods. Until that had been done, no decisions were taken or orders given to the soldiers. When 
the sacrifices proved favourable, the commander transmitted the orders for the day to the 
soldiers (cfr., HG., VI, 5, 17; An., IV, 3, 9; V, 4, 22). 
Then, the commander and captains passed the order to have breakfast to the heralds. This 
was really the beginning of the day. Now the στρατπεδον was opened and people allowed 
to enter and leave the camp. This was also when the night guards finished their watch (cfr., 
HG., VII, 1, 16; An., III, 2, 1; Lac., XII, 6). If the march was to continue that day, the camp 
had to be struck after breakfast, before starting off74. 
There are no references to any troop reviews in Xenophon sources, except in the 
Lacedemonian Republic. It could be a daily practice or perhaps only took place in special 
circumstances75. 
When the army stayed in the same place for a long time, the most important activities of 
the soldiers was to purchase provisions, plundering, or finding fooder. 
The meals took place in each tent, but the officers gathered for dinner in the com-
mander´s tent. This was when orders were given and the necessary decisions taken for the 
next day. It finished with libations to the gods, and then each official went back to his tent, 
night watches were posted, the watch-word was given and the time to rest in the military 
camp began. The beginning or the end of these periods was normally announced with horn 
calls to the whole camp76. 
Indeed, all the Greek armies followed this general routine. It was something that was 
commonly accepted as being for the general good and had to be borne in mind when under-
taking operations against the enemy. That meant not sending the soldiers out from the battle 
camp to fight before they had their first meal but trying to surprise the enemy before they 
had eaten; attacking the camp when there the watches were less vigilant, while they were 
preparing the meal, when many soldiers were out of the camp looking for booty in the free 
time, or early in the morning, or when the evening activities were just beginning (cfr., Cyr., 
I, 6, 36)77. 
 
 
10.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The first and main conclusion of our study is that the Greek military camp should be the 
subject of research and should get more than ten pages at most in any handbook on Greek 
warfare. Once the castramental vocabulary problem is resolved, and we know the exact dif-
ference on meaning between words like τ στρατπεδον, τ πλα or σκηνω, it will be 
possible to attempt an approximation to Greek castramental theory of the 4th century as it 
would have been described in lost contemporary works, such as the one by Aeneas Tacticus. 
———— 
74 Cfr., An., IV, 1, 12-14; III, 3, 1 (with a logic inversion of order due to the special circumstances). On naval 
forces: HG., II, 1, 22. Anderson thinks that the Greek armies usually started the march without having a regular cooked 
breakfast («cooked meal»), having their first meal at the end of the march at midday (Anderson, 1974: 90). But the 
sources and common sense say that the soldiers should have breakfast before the march. 
75 Cfr., An., II, 3, 1-3 (therefore Clearchus was in fact the first polemarch in Cyrus´ army). Liers said, following this 
text, that there was a daily review, intended to check that there was no one missing in the στρατπεδον (Liers, 1895: 154). 
76 In the case of naval forces, it was made by a signalling system between the ships: HG., II, 1, 22; Polyaen., III, 9, 
63; V, 32, 2. In Aeneas Tacticus we also find a signal system to announce to the troops in the territory the time for re-
shifting to the camp in the afternoon (VII, 2), the moment for preparing the dinner and starting the watch-posts (VII, 3; 
XVIII, 1) and the close of the city and start of the night time (X, 14). 
77 Going out to look for booty: HG., I, 2, 5; III, 2, 2-5; at lunch time: HG., I, 6, 21; Polyaen., I, 48, 4; VI, 27, 1; 
when the soldiers were out of the camp looking for provisions: HG., II, 1, 27-28; in the early morning: HG., II, 4, 4-6; 
IV, 1, 24; VII, 1, 16; Polyaen, IV, 6, 8. 
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The Greek military camp seems to have had a high level of professional organisation, 
with a regular plan and internal structure, a very sophisticated watch guard system and a rou-
tine that shows the generals´ concern for the order and discipline of their troops. Inside the 
camp, as well as in each military force, it was the group of soldiers who shared the same tent 
(tent companions or συσκηνα) that was the basic element around which the whole of life 
on campaign was organised.  
Although we have limited our sources to Xenophon´s works and our final view must be 
reached with caution due to the special nature and concern of Xenophon´s writings, the re-
sults are very positiv. However it is clear, too, that we must wait for more and wider research 
of the classical sources to reach a more general understanding of castramental theory in the 
classical Greek period. This is only the beginning.  
 
 
MAURICIO G. ÁLVAREZ RICO 
Centro Universitario Villanueva U.C.M. 
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